9. Islamistiske tendenser og nye retninger for liberale tankegange i nutidens Islam

Indledning
Fra 1950erne frem til 1970erne fik de muslimske reformretninger konkurrence fra nye ideologier – socialisme og den arabiske nationalisme. Men de skuffelser, som postkolonitidens samfund og revolutionen i Iran i 1979 bragte, skabte gunstige vilkår for en bekræftelse af islamisk identitet på det politiske og det sociale plan i form af den moderne salafiyya – radikalisme og forskellige politiske diskurser, der falder inden for betegnelsen ”islamisme”. I modsætning til disse bevægelser, der søger en tilbagevenden til den ”sande religion”, har betydelige intellektuelle personer inden for muslimsk tænkning og reformaktivistkredse til stadighed forsvaret teologisk liberalisme og nytolkning af de hellige tekster. De har desuden kritiseret den ”muslimske utopi” samt trukket visse af de muslimske samfunds tabubelagte sociale emner frem i lyset.
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Uddrag af Letter to the Young (’Brev til de unge’) af Hasan al-Banna, 1939

FIRSTLY: We need to redeem the Islamic personality: in thought and in creed, in behaviour and in emotion, as well as in action and dealings. Then this is our individual configuration.
SECONDLY: We need to establish the Islamic family: in thought and in creed, in behaviour and in emotion as well as in action and dealings. Therefore, our areas of work include the Muslim woman, the Muslim man, the Muslim child as well as the Muslim youth. And this he is our family configuration.
THIRDLY: We need to establish the Islamic nation, in all the previously mentioned characteristics. We thus must work hard, by using all possible means, in order to achieve the following goals: Make our Da’wah* reach every home, Spread our message everywhere, Make our concept easily accepted, Make our concept reach the villages and the hamlets, the cities and the capitals, and all world nations.
FOURTHLY: We need the Islamic government leads this nation to the mosque. Directs people to the guidance of Islam, as they were directed during the time of the Sahabah of Rasul Allah [companions of Allah’s messenger] like Abu Bakr and ‘Umar.
Therefore: We do not confess any governmental system that does not observe the precepts of Islam. We do not recognize any governmental system that does not derive its rules and principles from Islam. We do not support these political parties. We do not recognize these traditional systems whose laws had been forced upon us by “intellectuals” and the enemies of Islam. We will strive for the revival of the Islamic way of life in its entirety. And we will act in order to establish the Islamic government on the basis of this system.
FIFTHLY: We want to regain every part of our Islamic nation that has been usurped by Western nations’ policies. Therefore: We do not accept these political divisions and these international agreements that have torn the Islamic nation into small and weak mini-states that can easily be swallowed by their aggressors. We also do not disregard the usurpation and violation of freedom of these nations. For Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Hijaz, Yemen, Tripoli, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and each span of a land containing a Muslim who bears witness that, [There is no deity worthy of worship except Allah] constitutes an essential part of our great motherland that we strive hard to liberate, rescue, free and unify.
SIXTH: We seek to make the banner of Islam rise high and wave over those lands, which were cheered, for a certain period of time with Islam and the sound of Mu’azin* with Takbīr* [I.e.: the uttering of the phrase: Allah is greater] and Tahlīl* [I.e.: the uttering of the phrase: there is no deity worthy of worship except Allah] echoing the air. Then when bad luck struck upon those lands, it was, hence, decreed that the light of Islam has to be stopped and finally, each of these Islamic lands receded to a state of disbelief, Andalusia, Sicily, The Balkan, South Italy and Roman Sea Islands were all Islamic lands that had to be restored to the homeland of Islam. The Mediterranean and Red Sea should equally be part of the Islamic Empire as they were before.
LASTLY:We want to: make our Da’wa reach to the whole world. Propagate it to all nations. Spread it to the remotest parts of the earth, and subjugate every unjust ruler to its command, [Until there is no more tribulation and Allah’s religion reigns supreme] [And on that day, the believers will rejoice in the victory granted by Allah. He gives victory to whomsoever He wills. He is the All Mighty the Most Merciful] [The Qur’an, 30:4-5].

*Da'wa: Islamic call to join Islam in order to find the “true” Islam.
*Mu’azin: the caller for prayer.
*Takbīr: derivation from “great”, from the widely used sentence: “God is the Greatest”.
*Tahlīl : word stemming from the sentence: “The is no god but God”.


Uddrag af: The Complete Works of Imam Hasan al-Banna 9. Beyrouth, 1984


Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) var en egyptisk lærer, som i 1928 stiftede Det Muslimske Broderskab som ”den første moderne, fundamentalistiske bevægelse i Islam.” Begrebet brødre udtrykte både et åndeligt broderskab og medlemmernes loyalitet over for hinanden.
Denne tale blev holdt for broderskabet ved dets femte kongres i 1939 og blev senere udgivet som en pjece. Al-Banna blev leder af en stærk, struktureret og hierarkisk organisation. Broderskabet udbredte deres budskab i moskéer, på caféer, på landet og i byen. Al-Banna førte dagbog, skrev mange breve til sine tilhængere og holdt tusindvis af foredrag. Broderskabet blev en sand folkebevægelse ligesom Wafd, det sekulære, liberale og nationalistiske egyptiske parti.
Da det hverken var intellektuelt eller elitært orienteret, rekrutterede Det Muslimske Broderskab primært sine medlemmer fra den lavere middelklasse. Al-Bannas ideologi var på mange måder reformorienteret. Den genbrugte temaer udviklet af tidsskriftet al-Manar (se Islam 1, side 8) om  muslimsk solidaritet, om harmonien mellem Islam og den moderne verden, og om behovet for, at tekstudlægning og tolkning skulle nå frem til Islams oprindelige budskab. Muslimske brødre blev også involveret i den politiske kamp mod den britiske overmagt, men de udviklede ikke nogen bestemt politisk dagsorden.
De to kongstanker bag denne opfordring til unge mennesker fremstilles i dette uddrag:
- Islamisk identitet er en kompleks størrelse, der involverer mange identitetslag.
- Islamisering begynder med individet og når skridt for skridt den ”endelige islamisering”.

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Uddrag af Principles of the Indonesian Forum of Liberal Islam (’Det indonesiske liberal-islamiske forums grundsætninger’)

Open to all forms of intellectual exploration on all dimensions of Islam. (…) Closing the door of interpretations of Islam, partly or wholly, is a threat on Islam itself, because by being so Islam will rot. Liberal Muslims believe critical thinking can be done from many points of view, particularly ones that relate to social interaction, rituals, and theologies.
Liberal Muslims believe literal-textual readings of the Quran and Sunnah will only cripple Islam. On the contrary, an interpretation that is more religio-ethics will allow Islam to flourish creatively and be part of the global civilization (…)
Liberal Muslims believe the idea of truth (in the interpretation of religion) is relative, on the grounds that human interpretations of it are made under certain circumstances or contexts; it is also open in the sense that the interpretations could be wrong or right; it is plural in the sense that one way or another it reflects the needs of the interpreters which change depending on time and space. (…)
Liberal Muslims believe the authorities of the religions and the politics must be separated. Liberal Muslims oppose the idea of theocracy. Religions are sources of inspirations that could influence public policy making, but they should not become holy prerogatives that grant the freedom to steer those policies. Religion should be of the private domain, whereas public affairs should be administered through consensual process.

Uddrag af: Principles of the Indonesian Forum of Liberal Islam, af Jarigan Islam Liberal (JIL).


Med 87% muslimer ud af sine 230 millioner indbyggere er Indonesien i 2007 det største muslimske land i verden. Her er islamiseringen kommet gradvist. Den begyndte med handelsskibe og fremmede prædikanters ankomst, men Islam blev ikke udbredt i den brede befolkning før i 1600-tallet. Reformtraditionen begyndte også på denne tid. Nu til dags findes mange religiøse retninger side om side, såsom mystisk Islam, dogmatisk Islam og ritualistisk Islam. I 1945 antog staten doktrinen om de fem principper (Pancasila) og anførte troen på Gud i princippernes første artikel.
JIL (Jarigan Islam Liberal) er et internetdiskussionsforum (www.islamlib.com) lanceret i 2001. Dets mål er at udbrede en tolerant og liberal diskurs i Indonesien som modvægt til den islamistiske diskurs. JIL-netværket har sammenbragt over tusind intellektuelle, religiøse og sekulære medlemmer. Kun et mindretal af JILs ledere har studeret uden for Indonesien. JILs koordinator er Ulil Abshar Abdallah.
Diskussionsemnerne kommer fra den muslimske liberale tradition: kvinders status, dialog og tværreligiøse ægteskaber, bekæmpelse af polygami, demokrati, ytringsfrihed, kritik af sharia osv.
JILs initiativer har mødt stærk kritik fra Nahdlatul Ulama, en magtfuld konservativ masseorganisation, som har udstedt adskillige kollektive fatwaer for frafald mod lederne af JIL.
I 1998 påbegyndte Indonesien en proces rettet mod en overgang til demokrati efter Suhartos æra (1967-1998), en periode kendetegnet ved depolitisering af samfundet og missionsbevægelsen Djamaat al-tablighs fremgang. Under Suharto tilgodeså moderniseringen af det indonesiske uddannelsessystem dog udviklingen af en ny generation af intellektuelle samt sponsorering fra udenlandske fonde med henblik på indonesiske studerendes muligheder for at uddanne sig uden for landets grænser.

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Intellektuel utilstrækkelighed og nye ideologier i nutidens Islam

The total lack of theological, ethical and legal reasoning is almost never emphasized by those who speak so confidently about the “awakening of Islam”, the “Islamic revolution”, the “return to religion”, "Islamic fundamentalism", etc. The narrowing of the intellectual field in contemporary Islamic thought is proportional to the ideological expansion assigning to Islam new functions that are anti-religious and even anti-spiritual: Islam is a refuge for the identity of ethno-cultural societies and groups pulled out from their traditional structures and values by the material civilization mingled with intellectual modernity. It is also a den for all social forms that cannot express themselves politically outside from areas protected by religious immunity like the mosque; it is at last a launching pad for those who want to take power (...).

Mohammed Arkoun, ABC de l-Islam. Pour sortir des clôtures dogmatiques, Michel Grancher, 2007, s. 180. Oversat af Marie Lebert..


Mohammed Arkoun (1928-2010) var akademiker født i Algeriet og specialiserede sig i islamisk idéhistorie. Hans vigtigste forskningsfelt var kritikken af ”islamisk fornuft”. Islamisk tradition har altid hævdet at gøre brug af fornuften i samklang med åbenbaringen. Ifølge traditionen har fornuften guddommelige rødder, idet den er Guds gave til mennesket. Denne tanke har inspireret megen post-profetisk lærd litteratur fra 800-tallet og fremefter.
Mohammed Arkoun agiterede for en komplet gentolkning af de muslimske religiøse og juridiske kilder og underkaste dem moderne metoder fra de sociale videnskaber (lingvistik, semiotik osv.) samt se dem i lyset af moderne problematikker. Hans mål var at modarbejde den fundamentalistiske ortodoksi, der udnyttede kilderne til sin egen fordel og hævdede at repræsentere det ”sande Islam”, mens det i virkeligheden kun repræsenterede et ”frossent Islam”.